Nov
10
Federalists 18-20 – Madison (and Hamilton?)
November 10, 2009 | Leave a Comment
Before looking at Federalists 18, 19, and 20, I note that there’s some dispute about the authorship of these three. Madison is universally credited with being at least the co-author of all three essays, and many sources give sole credit to him. The Benjamin Wright edition that I use lists Madison singly as the author, but the website where I am linking to cites Madison and Hamilton as co-authors. My own sense after closely reading them is that there is at least a trace of Alexander Hamilton present, especially in numbers 19 and 20. At any rate, I’ll simply refer to the author as Publius for this group of papers.
Publius gives a bit of a history lesson in Federalists 18-20. He traces the history of ancient confederacies and analyzes the causes of their collective failures. He starts out in number 18 by taking a look at the Greek confederacies and observes that they all retained their independence and sovereignty.
The members retained the character of independent and sovereign states, and had equal votes in the federal council. This council had a general authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on war; to decide, in the last resort, all controversies between the members; to fine the aggressing party; to employ the whole force of the confederacy against the disobedient; to admit new members. The Amphictyons were the guardians of religion, and of the immense riches belonging to the temple of Delphos, where they had the right of jurisdiction in controversies between the inhabitants and those who came to consult the oracle. As a further provision for the efficacy of the federal powers, they took an oath mutually to defend and protect the united cities, to punish the violators of this oath, and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious despoilers of the temple.
Theoretically, this seemed like a strong edifice from which to build a stable confederacy, and in fact the league had greater powers than those contained in the Articles of Confederation. But in practice, it was a week form of government.
Very different, nevertheless, was the experiment from the theory. The powers, like those of the present Congress, were administered by deputies appointed wholly by the cities in their political capacities; and exercised over them in the same capacities. Hence the weakness, the disorders, and finally the destruction of the confederacy. The more powerful members, instead of being kept in awe and subordination, tyrannized successively over all the rest. Athens, as we learn from Demosthenes, was the arbiter of Greece seventy-three years. The Lacedaemonians next governed it twenty-nine years; at a subsequent period, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans had their turn of domination.
Publius begins to examine how the more powerful members of the confederacy dominated the weaker. Athens and Sparta were dominant at various periods of Grecian history, and instead of cooperating with one another, they acted with jealousy and suspicion in order to guard their own power.
After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it appears that the Lacedaemonians required that a number of the cities should be turned out of the confederacy for the unfaithful part they had acted. The Athenians, finding that the Lacedaemonians would lose fewer partisans by such a measure than themselves, and would become masters of the public deliberations, vigorously opposed and defeated the attempt. This piece of history proves at once the inefficiency of the union, the ambition and jealousy of its most powerful members, and the dependent and degraded condition of the rest. The smaller members, though entitled by the theory of their system to revolve in equal pride and majesty around the common center, had become, in fact, satellites of the orbs of primary magnitude.
This uneven balance and constant irritation led inevitably to the disastrous Pelopponnesian War, which in turn weakened most of the Greek city states. Constant warfare led to internal struggles, civil war, foreign aggression, and other evils which destabilized the entire region. This system led to the collapse of the entire confederacy and, in the end, subjugation.
Had Greece, says a judicious observer on her fate, been united by a stricter confederation, and persevered in her union, she would never have worn the chains of Macedon; and might have proved a barrier to the vast projects of Rome.
Publius also discusses the Achean league, which was another Greek confederacy. The unified government was somewhat more efficiently organized, and they managed to avoid some of the calamities experienced by those aligned with Sparta and Athens. Publius also claims that the unified government acted more wisely than the individual member states.
One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians who take notice of Achaean affairs. It is, that as well after the renovation of the league by Aratus, as before its dissolution by the arts of Macedon, there was infinitely more of moderation and justice in the administration of its government, and less of violence and sedition in the people, than were to be found in any of the cities exercising SINGLY all the prerogatives of sovereignty. The Abbe Mably, in his observations on Greece, says that the popular government, which was so tempestuous elsewhere, caused no disorders in the members of the Achaean republic, because it was there tempered by the general authority and laws of the confederacy.
The Achean League was subject to some of the same problems that afflicted the other Grecian confederacy, but it managed to sustain itself a little longer thanks in part to the way in which it was organized. There was a greater balance between the member states, and the central government had more authority. However, the Achean confederacy began to dissolve soon after the fall of the Amphictyonic (discussed above). Unable to remain united, the Acheans soon also fell subject to foreign domination.
Publius concludes by stating:
I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this important portion of history; both because it teaches more than one lesson, and because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean constitution, it emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal bodies rather to anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the head.
In the 19th paper, Publius turns to the Germanic confederacies, and again the examples furnished by these confederacies demonstrates their tendency to slide into anarchy. He begins by discussing how the brief unity manifested during the reign of Charlemagne crumbled upon his death, leading to the breakup of the Germaninc empire.
The force of imperial sovereignty was insufficient to restrain such powerful dependants; or to preserve the unity and tranquillity of the empire. The most furious private wars, accompanied with every species of calamity, were carried on between the different princes and states. The imperial authority, unable to maintain the public order, declined by degrees till it was almost extinct in the anarchy, which agitated the long interval between the death of the last emperor of the Suabian, and the accession of the first emperor of the Austrian lines. In the eleventh century the emperors enjoyed full sovereignty: In the fifteenth they had little more than the symbols and decorations of power.
Germany then developed from a feudal to a federal system. Publius discusses the makeup of the contemporary German federal system: the makeup of the diet, the powers of the emperor, and the imperial chamber. The diet’s powers are quite limited, while the emperor has an extensive number of prerogatives. Publius describes in great detail what hew views as the weaknesses of this system.
From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the representatives and head of this confederacy, the natural supposition would be, that it must form an exception to the general character which belongs to its kindred systems. Nothing would be further from the reality. The fundamental principle on which it rests, that the empire is a community of sovereigns, that the diet is a representation of sovereigns and that the laws are addressed to sovereigns, renders the empire a nerveless body, incapable of regulating its own members, insecure against external dangers, and agitated with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels.
The history of Germany is a history of wars between the emperor and the princes and states; of wars among the princes and states themselves; of the licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of the weak; of foreign intrusions, and foreign intrigues; of requisitions of men and money disregarded, or partially complied with; of attempts to enforce them, altogether abortive, or attended with slaughter and desolation, involving the innocent with the guilty; of general inbecility, confusion, and misery.
He continues to examine the conflicts that plagued the region, and adds:
The impossibility of maintaining order and dispensing justice among these sovereign subjects, produced the experiment of dividing the empire into nine or ten circles or districts; of giving them an interior organization, and of charging them with the military execution of the laws against delinquent and contumacious members. This experiment has only served to demonstrate more fully the radical vice of the constitution. Each circle is the miniature picture of the deformities of this political monster. They either fail to execute their commissions, or they do it with all the devastation and carnage of civil war. Sometimes whole circles are defaulters; and then they increase the mischief which they were instituted to remedy.
If this system was so weak and so ineffectual, then what kept it from completely falling apart? Publius answers that it was the weakness of the members that kept things together.
It may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this disjointed machine from falling entirely to pieces? The answer is obvious: The weakness of most of the members, who are unwilling to expose themselves to the mercy of foreign powers; the weakness of most of the principal members, compared with the formidable powers all around them; the vast weight and influence which the emperor derives from his separate and heriditary dominions; and the interest he feels in preserving a system with which his family pride is connected, and which constitutes him the first prince in Europe; —these causes support a feeble and precarious Union; whilst the repellant quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty, and which time continually strengthens, prevents any reform whatever, founded on a proper consolidation. Nor is it to be imagined, if this obstacle could be surmounted, that the neighboring powers would suffer a revolution to take place which would give to the empire the force and preeminence to which it is entitled. Foreign nations have long considered themselves as interested in the changes made by events in this constitution; and have, on various occasions, betrayed their policy of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness.
Publius compares the German confederacy to the situation in the United States.
So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison with that of the United States, it serves to confirm the principle intended to be established. Whatever efficacy the union may have had in ordinary cases, it appears that the moment a cause of difference sprang up, capable of trying its strength, it failed. The controversies on the subject of religion, which in three instances have kindled violent and bloody contests, may be said, in fact, to have severed the league. The Protestant and Catholic cantons have since had their separate diets, where all the most important concerns are adjusted, and which have left the general diet little other business than to take care of the common bailages.
This is the point Publius wants to hammer home. The experiences of these confederacies should serve as a warning to those that oppose a stronger national government. A failure to shore up the central government will leave us in the same condition as these woefully inept republics.
Publius finishes his review with the Netherlands confederacy. He again traces the makeup of this system, and describes it thusly:
Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy, as delineated on parchment. What are the characters which practice has stamped upon it? Imbecility in the government; discord among the provinces; foreign influence and indignities; a precarious existence in peace, and peculiar calamities from war.
After detailing the various calamities that have befallen the Netherlands, Publius adds:
This unhappy people seem to be now suffering from popular convulsions, from dissensions among the states, and from the actual invasion of foreign arms, the crisis of their distiny. All nations have their eyes fixed on the awful spectacle. The first wish prompted by humanity is, that this severe trial may issue in such a revolution of their government as will establish their union, and render it the parent of tranquillity, freedom and happiness: The next, that the asylum under which, we trust, the enjoyment of these blessings will speedily be secured in this country, may receive and console them for the catastrophe of their own.
Finally, he concludes the long discourse.
I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation of these federal precedents. Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The important truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in the present case, is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity, by substituting violence in place of law, or the destructive coercion of the sword in place of the mild and salutary coercion of the magistracy.
This review has meant to establish that America is on the brink of becoming just like these other confederacies. As previous essays have shown, Publius sees a country on the brink of anarchy, just like these historical and contemporary systems. A loose confederation cannot truly provide the cohesion and strength necessary to keep the United States prosperous and harmonious. So Publius has dug through the history books to provide a little more concrete evidence as to why the Constitution must be ratified: to save us from becoming like the Greeks, Germans, and Dutch.